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Abstract 
This paper examines the role of the South African National Assembly in 
comparative perspective by discussing the experience of the Assembly since 
1994 in comparison to the development of legislative institutions elsewhere in 
Africa.  The paper thus begins with an overview of seven sets of variables that 
seem to drive the process of legislative development across the continent, and 
then turns to the South African case.  The “conventional wisdom” (CW) on the 
National Assembly—usually by observers who have spent little time at 
Parliament—is that the body is little more than a rubber stamp of the ruling 
African National Congress.   The paper explores the validity of this view 
concluding that it is not inaccurate—to a degree.   The combination of ANC’s 
supra majority, its organisational culture and modus operandi, and South 
Africa’s system of proportional representation all reduce the independence of 
the legislature.  The paper then examines five dimensions of the legislative 
process and argues that the CW reflects only part of the reality.  The National 
Assembly is not a mere rubber stamp.  More interesting from a theoretical 
perspective, the same variables that facilitate or undermine the emergence of 
the legislature as an institution of countervailing power elsewhere in Africa, 
apply to the South African case as well. 
                                                 
1 This paper is based mainly on interviews conducted with 36 Members of Parliament and 
staff of the South African National Assembly between April 28th and June 7th, 2004.  The 
author wishes to acknowledge the financial and logistical support of the Democracy in Africa 
Research Unit of the Centre for Social Science Research at the University of Cape Town for 
making this study possible.  The study is limited to a consideration of the National Assembly, 
the lower house of the Parliament of South Africa. 
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The Puzzle: Explaining Legislative Capacity 
and Autonomy 
Consistent with “conventional wisdom” that the holding of multiparty elections 
does not guarantee a transition to liberal democracy (Karl 1989, Zakaria 1997, 
Joseph 1998, Carothers 2002, Ottaway 2003, etc.), recent research on African 
legislatures finds that such elections, even when “free and fair,” do not 
guarantee the emergence of a strong and autonomous national legislature 
(Barkan et. al. 2004).  Yet an autonomous directly elected legislature is a 
hallmark of all liberal democracies.   When fully developed, in terms of its 
capacity to perform its collective functions, the legislature is an institution of 
countervailing power that facilitates both horizontal accountability across 
governmental agencies, and downward accountability to the public.   The 
holding of multiparty elections is thus a necessary but insufficient condition for 
the establishment of such an institution.   
In addition to elections, seven sets of variables appear to determine the extent to 
which legislatures in emerging African democracies become institutions of 
countervailing power—especially vis-à-vis the executive branch.   These are: 
(1) The pressures of patron-client politics.   These pressures, which are 
particularly strong in the context of agrarian and plural societies, constitute a set 
of incentives for individual legislators to spend most of their time on 
constituency service.  Conversely, they constitute a set of disincentives for 
legislators to devote equal or greater time to the collective functions of 
legislatures, which when performed effectively, contribute to the autonomy and 
relative power of the institution.  These include the examination of existing and 
prospective public policy, responding to the demands of civil society, the 
deliberation and crafting of legislation, involvement in the budgetary process, 
oversight of the executive branch, etc.  (2) The formal rules, both constitutional 
and legislative, that specify the scope, power and procedures of the legislature.  
(3) The level of legislative salaries.   Where parliamentary pay is low, MPs are 
far more vulnerable to becoming dependent on political bosses, especially the 
heads of neo-patrimonial regimes and their immediate entourage, than where 
salaries are high.  (4)  The collective resources and capacity of the legislature 
including the level of its overall budget, its autonomy in setting its budget, the 
quality and experience of parliamentary staff, the level of support for 
parliamentary committees, the level and quality of physical infrastructure, etc., 
(5) Whether there is parity or near parity in terms of the number of seats held 
by government and opposition parties. (6) The type of electoral system for 
converting votes into seats.  (7)  The presence of a coalition of “reformers” 
and/or “opportunists” that seeks to overcome the disincentives for collective 
action cited under (1) and raise the level of resources available to 
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parliamentarians described under (3) and (4)  (Barkan et. al. 2004).2   The 
presence or absence of civil society organisations that lobby members of the 
legislature as well as support provided by foreign aid organisations also 
contributes to the institutional development of these bodies.    
These tentative findings were derived from four case studies of African 
legislatures conducted by the author and his collaborators in 2002—the National 
Assemblies in Benin, Ghana, Kenya and Senegal.  The studies were conducted 
to assess how these legislatures functioned following the reintroduction of 
multiparty politics in the early 1990s,3 and an alternation of government that 
had occurred in three of the four countries included in the study.4  These 
conclusions, however, are at best hypotheses that require data from additional 
cases to confirm or reject.    Though highly suggestive, the findings “explain” 
the emergence of the legislature in terms of too many variables given the small 
number of cases considered.  Do these conclusions hold up upon examination of 
the legislative process elsewhere in the continent?   And do they hold up in the 
context of South Africa, a country whose political history and demography is 
very different from the four cases considered in the initial study? 
The South African National Assembly: Another 
Instance of South African Exceptionalism? 
As is well-known to even casual observers, the structural context of South 
African politics is markedly different from the rest of Africa in two important 
respects.  First, its politics remains a legacy of the Apartheid era when a 
government elected by roughly 11 percent of the population monopolised 
political and economic power.   Since 1994 when a government dominated by 
the African National Congress (ANC) came to power on the basis of one person 
                                                 
2 The study cited was conducted between March and August, 2002 with support from several 
departments at the World Bank including the Public Sector Reform Unit of the Africa 
Region, the Development Research Council, the World Bank Institute and the Poverty 
Reduction and Management unit.   The conclusions reached by the researchers involved in 
this study do not represent the views of the World Bank, but only the authors. 
3 Senegal resumed a qualified form of multiparty politics in 1976 which limited the number 
of parties to three.  This limitation was removed in 1980. 
4 Benin achieved an alternation of government in its first multiparty election held in 1991.   In 
Ghana (2002) and Kenya (2002), alternation did not occur until the third multiparty election.  
In Senegal, the opposition won in the sixth multiparty election held in 2000.  
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one vote, the overriding political issue5 has been “How to overcome the 
inequalities bequeathed by Apartheid while keeping the country on a prudent 
course of macroeconomic policy to increase economic growth?”  While this 
question has faced other post-colonial regimes in Southern Africa, it is a salient 
issue in only four countries of the sub-continent.   
Second, as the only industrial and urbanised society in Africa,6 South Africa’s 
politics does not resemble that of the agrarian societies to its north.  South 
Africa is not a country whose peoples are mobilised politically on the basis of 
their local community of residence or ethnicity, but rather on the basis of race 
and class.7   Patron-client structures are therefore not the dominant form of 
political organisation as they are elsewhere on the continent.   Although 
clientelist relationships certainly exist in South Africa, the dominant form of 
political organisation are those normally associated with industrial and urban 
societies, i.e. political parties with clear programmatic agendas, and interest 
groups such as trade unions, professional and business organisations, etc. 
formed to address the economic concerns of their respective members.   
Although different political parties certainly draw their supporters from 
different types of communities and different neighborhoods—a clear reflection 
of residential patterns established during the Apartheid era—geography per se is 
not the principal basis of political cleavage.  Whereas “left-right” politics is 
barely visible across the rest of the continent, it is very prevalent in South 
Africa.    
However, one should not—as South African social scientists are prone to do—
dwell excessively on these factors and assert that South Africa is an exception 
to the politics of the rest of the continent in most respects.  Notwithstanding its 
unique history, South Africa is in the midst of its own transition from 
authoritarian to democratic rule.  And like the other 43 countries of the 
continent that returned to some measure of electoral democracy during the 
1990s, the South African National Assembly faces several challenges that are 
similar to the challenges faced by legislatures to  the north.  Several of the 
independent variables that appear to advance or retard the development of 
legislatures across Africa (or at least in our four initial cases), appear to have the 
same impact on the process in South Africa depending upon the ordinal values 
of these variables in the South African context.   It is therefore instructive to 
consider the South African case of legislative development in comparison with 
                                                 
5 Actually, a basket of overlapping sectoral issues, e.g. education, health, urban planning, 
land and agricultural policy, public works and infrastructure, trade and industry, macro-
economic policy, etc. embracing nearly all aspects of South African life. 
6 Nearly 60 percent of South Africa’s population is now classified as urban. 
7 Ethnicity has been, at times, the basis for political mobilisation as in Kwazulu Natal. 
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a sample of legislatures drawn from elsewhere on the continent precisely 
because the conditions in South Africa are so different.  Examination of the 
South African case facilitates a comparison and a theoretical understanding of 
what drives the development of the legislatures, because it provides us with a 
greater range of variance with respect to each key independent variable that 
appears to drive the process.  
Testing the Conventional Wisdom:  A Rubber 
Stamp Legislature? 
Few systematic studies exist of the South African National Assembly.  In 
marked contrast to the South Africa’s constitution and electoral system, the 
national legislature has attracted little scholarly attention.   A major exception to 
this generalisation will be   Nijzink’s forthcoming dissertation (Nijzink 2006).  
A review of the first five years of the National Assembly following the historic 
1994 election was published by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa 
(IDASA) in 1999 (Calland 1999), and the Institute’s Parliamentary Monitoring 
Group (PMG) continues to report the proceedings of the National Assembly and 
the National Council of Provinces, the upper house of Parliament.8  Nijzink 
(2001) has discussed the role of the opposition in the National Assembly.  
Murray and Nijzink (2002) also examined the constitutional powers for both 
houses and for South Africa’s provincial legislatures, while Nijzink and Piombo 
(2005) assess the performance of the National Assembly.  However, none of 
these reports explain the quality of performance by the National Assembly in 
comparison with the performance of other legislatures in other emerging (and 
especially African) democracies.    
The “conventional wisdom” among students of South African politics is that the 
National Assembly is a weak legislature and little more than a rubber stamp for 
the ruling ANC.  Though it has all the formal accoutrements of a modern 
legislature—detailed rules of procedure, an extensive committee system, a 
professional staff, an elaborate physical infrastructure, etc., the Assembly 
cannot be regarded as an autonomous branch of government and certainly not 
an institution of countervailing power capable of checking the executive.   
                                                 
8 The Parliamentary Monitoring Group is a project of IDASA, the Institute for Democracy in 
South Africa.  Its purpose is to monitor the activities of parliament and all key committees by 
disseminating periodic reports to subscribers seeking to track the progress of pending 
legislation.  See www.pmg.za    
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A cursory review of the Assembly and the political context within which it 
operates, leads many observers to this conclusion.  Indeed, the combination of 
six factors or tendencies support this view.   
(1) South Africa is a one-party dominant political system, and has been such 
since the country’s transition to majority rule in 1994.  The number of effective 
electoral and parliamentary, as calculated by the Laakso-Taagepera index is 
1.97 (Laakso-Taagepera 1979).  The ANC won 62.5 percent of the vote in 1994, 
66.4 percent in 1999 and 69.7 percent in 2004.  It currently holds 279 seats to 
121 for the combined opposition.  The opposition is also fragmented.  In the 
most recent election, the largest opposition party, the Democratic Alliance 
(DA), won only 12.5 percent of the vote, and 50 seats or one eighth of all MPs.   
The remaining 71 seats were divided amongst ten parties.   The domination by 
the ANC is compounded by the fact that the DA draws most of its support from 
white voters while the ANC, notwithstanding its commitment to non-racialism, 
is supported mainly by African South Africans.  Put differently, there is no 
credible alternative to the ANC that draws significant support from South 
Africa’s African population. 
(2)  Members of the National Assembly are elected via the Droop method of list 
PR which is implemented at two tiers.   At the national level, 200 members are 
elected from competing national party lists, while at the provincial level, 200 
are elected from a series of nine sets of competing provincial lists.  The number 
of members elected from each province varies in relation to the percentage of 
South Africa’s population living in the province.  Voters thus cast a single ballot 
for the party of their choice, and do not have the option of indicating their 
candidate preference.   The use of the “closed list” system means that leaders of 
all parties, and especially ANC leaders, control the rank order of their 
candidates on both the national and provincial lists.   This in turn means that the 
leadership exercises considerable leverage over ANC MPs to be highly 
disciplined and “tow the line” when it comes to defending the party’s positions 
in parliament.    
Failure to accept party discipline may result in a lowering of one’s position on 
the ANC’s list at the next election, denial of renomination, or to one’s 
immediate “redeployment” to another position deemed important by the party—
i.e. sitting ANC MPs can be summarily dropped from parliament in the middle 
of their elected term.9   While the number redeployed during any one 
parliamentary session is relatively small (five or less per year), the threat of 
redeployment is a weapon the leadership has not been reluctant to use.  This is 
                                                 
9 “Redeployment” can also mean a promotion out of the National Assembly to a cabinet 
position or other high position in government. 
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especially true since Thabo Mbeki became the party’s leader and President of 
South Africa in 1999.  The threat of redeployment has had its intended effect, 
particularly on those ANC MPs who have few opportunities for employment in 
the private sector at salaries approaching those they receive as MPs.  MPs with 
limited formal education—usually African members who owe their seats to 
their involvement in the armed struggle against Apartheid—are particularly 
vulnerable.  Highly educated MPs and professionals, a disproportionate number 
of whom are white, are less susceptible to this pressure. 
(3) The ANC is a highly centralised organisation where power has become 
increasingly concentrated in the hands of President Thabo Mbeki and the party 
leadership.  As president of the ANC, Mbeki chairs the party’s highest two 
organs, the National Executive Committee, and the National Working 
Committee which makes day-to-day policy.  The Working Committee thus sets 
the agenda for both the cabinet of the South African government of which 
Mbeki is also president, and the ruling party’s agenda for parliament. 
Although the ANC is historically a centralised organisation modeled on the 
soviet example, the ANC leadership was forced to grant considerable autonomy 
to local party cells and community groups during the 1980s when the fight 
against apartheid played out in South Africa’s urban townships while the party’s 
top leadership was in exile or jail.   Nelson Mandela accepted such autonomy 
after becoming president of both the ANC and South Africa in 1994, but Mbeki 
reasserted central control following his ascension to the presidencies of both 
party and state in 1999.  That said, it is important to appreciate that the ANC is 
very different from most political parties elsewhere in Africa.   Unlike such 
parties it is not a patronage based organisation dominated by the head of 
government that comes to life solely at the time of national elections to mobilise 
rural voters.   Instead, but like parties in industrial democracies, the ANC is a 
party with a clear ideology and programme.   It is also a party that maintains a 
grassroots organisation between elections.   Similarly, Thabo Mbeki is not a 
neo-patrimonial party leader in the manner of a Mobutu, Moi or Mugabe.   
Despite some scandals, most notably the recent allegations of bribery against 
former Deputy President Jacob Zuma, South Africa is relatively free of 
corruption.  Most important, corruption and patronage are not the bases of its 
political control.10   However, Mbeki’s centralisation of power does mean that 
he clearly regards Parliament as a subordinate branch of government–both to the 
executive and to the highest organs of the ANC. 
                                                 
10 Indeed, Mbeki made this very distinction by firing Zuma from his post as South Africa’s 
deputy  president in July 2005 along with 30 ANC MPs who supported his retention.  Zuma, 
who was the leader of government business in the National Assembly, continues in his 
position of deputy president of the ANC.   
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With respect to the Parliament, this means that the ANC leadership expects that 
it is the decisions of the National Working Committee sitting in Pretoria, not 
Cape Town (where the National Assembly is located) that calls the shots in 
terms of setting the parliamentary agenda, determining which legislation shall 
be passed, etc.  The Working Committee communicates this agenda via weekly 
meetings of the ANC Parliamentary Caucus that last up to three hours.11  The 
Caucus is usually chaired by the Deputy President.  Following initial 
announcements, selected ministers take turns discussing the issues to be 
addressed by legislation that they will introduce or which will be read for the 
second time during the following week.  Party whips are present.   Questions 
from the floor follow and the discussion is sometimes quite extensive, even 
spirited.  But it is also clear who is in charge and what is expected of the rank 
and file.  As one long-time participant described it to this author, “The process 
is democratic, but it is not ‘bottom-up.’”   He further observed that the 
relationship between ministers and the ANC rank and file, including chairs of 
portfolio committees is mixed.   Some ministers develop a very cooperative and 
reciprocal relationship with committees and their chairs, while others are prone 
to dictate. 
Other parties also caucus weekly thus emphasising the importance of party for 
the manner in which the National Assembly transacts its business.   In addition, 
each party maintains a caucus or “study group” for each portfolio committee.   
Given the ANC’s large majority, it is within the ANC committee study groups 
that the details of most legislation are  trashed out.   Committee meetings of the 
whole are open to the public including the press, but meetings of the study 
groups are not.  ANC committee study groups are thus viewed by the executive 
and by the Working Committee as the arenas within which the will of the 
leadership is implemented.   This means that while meetings of the entire 
committee exhibit considerable debate between parties, and while the same 
occurs on the floor of the National Assembly as a whole, the decision making 
process occurs largely behind closed doors—in the Working Committee,  in the 
ANC parliamentary caucus, and in the ANC committee study groups prior to 
the meetings involving all parties.  Not surprisingly, this frustrates some 
members of the opposition though others contend that much genuine business, 
i.e. the deliberation and crafting of legislation, is also conducted in the 
multiparty forums. 
The Working Committee further asserts its authority by appointing the chairs 
and members of all portfolio committees in the National Assembly as well as 
                                                 
11 The Parliamentary Caucus meets every Thursday and consists of all ANC members of both 
the National Assembly (the lower house) and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP).  
Over 300 members are usually present at the caucus. 
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the chairs of the Rules Committee, the Committee on Committees, the Speaker 
and the Deputy Speaker.   The Working Committee is also the dominant voice 
in committee assignments though MPs are given opportunity to state their 
preferences.   During the “first” parliament which sat from 1994 to 1999, 
committee assignments were based more on MP’s preferences than they are 
today while committee chairs were elected by the members of the committee.   
The control of assignments and chairships by the Working Committee is 
perhaps the main indicator of increased control by the ANC leadership since 
Mbeki became president.  Yet another indicator was the decision by the ANC 
following the 2004 elections to name the chair of the Standing Committee on 
Public Accounts (SCOPA), a position historically chaired by a member of the 
opposition.12 
(4)  The nature of “the ANC project,” and its impact on relations between the 
ANC and “the loyal opposition.”   The raison d’etre of the ANC, since its 
inception in 1911, has been to reverse 300 years of racial domination by South 
African whites over African and other non-white citizens.   As enshrined in the 
Freedom Charter of 1955 and in subsequent documents since 1994,13 the 
elimination of political, economic and social inequality between the members of 
different classes and racial groups, remains the guiding policy of the 
organisation fifty years hence.  This in turn shapes the ANC’s relations with 
other political parties, and how especially it judges and interacts with the 
Democratic Alliance, the largest opposition party and the “official opposition” 
in the National Assembly.    
Given its formal commitment to a “democratic South Africa,” the government 
and the ruling party have, with few lapses, scrupulously respected the rights of 
the opposition.14  But there is a clear tension between respecting the formal 
rights of the opposition and engaging the opposition; or putting it more 
                                                 
12 Notwithstanding the trend towards centralization, several MPs have served as chairs of 
their committees since the first parliament, e.g. Rob Davies of Trade and Industry. 
13 In the run-up to its assumption of power in 1994, the ANC published its policy of RDP, the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme, which was intended as the blueprint for 
realising the goals of the Freedom Charter within the context of the 1990s.   However, the 
macro-economic realities facing South Africa meant that RDP was soon replaced by GEAR, 
the Growth, Employment and Redistribution programme, a less ambitious programme of 
poverty reduction consistent with the Washington consensus.  Not surprisingly, there is much 
debate within the ANC as to whether GEAR is in fact consistent with the historic goals of the 
ANC. 
14 One such lapse was the decision by the ruling party to assume the chairship of SCOPA, the 
Standing Committee on Current Accounts, a committee that has historically, both in South 
Africa and across the Commonwealth, been chaired by a member of the largest opposition 
party. 
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accurately, letting the opposition engage the ANC.   In fact, there is a significant 
philosophical and social distance between the ANC and the Democratic 
Alliance that is unlikely to be bridged in the near term.  This leads the ANC to 
keep the DA at arms length and view the party with suspicion.  Why this 
approach? 
The answer lies in both the ANC’s “project” and the manner in which the DA 
approaches its work.  With respect to the first, the ANC is prepared to listen to 
and work with those opposition parties who accept the ANC’s main agenda.  In 
other words, those parties that may oppose the ANC yet provide useful criticism 
regarding how to best  achieve true equality in South Africa by reversing the 
legacies of apartheid, are treated with respect and engaged.   Conversely, those 
parties that are perceived as opposing the project itself, and who are intent on 
“scoring points” by opposing the ANC on nearly every issue and every piece of 
proposed legislation for the purpose of “keeping the government on its toes,” 
are loathed 
The relationship between government and opposition is also coloured by style 
and tradition.   On the one hand, the ANC regards itself as a “non-racial” party, 
one whose supporters are predominantly African in terms of race and culture, 
but a party that includes the members of all racial groups.   By contrast, it 
perceives the DA as not only a “white” party, but one that is mired excessively 
in the traditions of the British House of Commons in Westminster.  The 
preponderance of DA MPs are English-speaking whites, and the style of many 
and especially the party leader, Tony Leon, is regarded as unnecessarily 
argumentative for argument sake, i.e. that the DA emphasises debate over 
substance and thus does not contribute to better legislation or, by extension, to a 
“better South Africa.” 
The ANC’s relationship with other opposition parties is arguably more cordial.   
ANC MPs frequently remark that much to their initial surprise, they get on well 
with Afrikaans-speaking whites, regardless of their party and including those 
who are members of the Democratic Alliance.   The reason given is that 
Afrikaans-speaking politicians understand “the ANC’s project”, because they 
once pursued a similar project on behalf of their community—the use of state 
power to uplift a subordinate group. 
(5) The Role of the Speaker in the evolution of the National Assembly.   A key 
individual in the development of the National Assembly during the first ten 
years of the post-Apartheid era was the Speaker, Frene Ginwala who served in 
that capacity from 1994 to 2004.   Regarded by many MPs as somewhat 
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imperious and autocratic,15 she was also highly respected for the commitment 
and professionalism she brought to the operations of the Assembly.  Having 
served as the head of the ANC’s policy research office, Ginwala’s charge 
following the 1994 elections was to “make the Assembly work”  in a manner 
that reflected the political transition.   This meant that on the one hand, she had 
to take control of an operation and staff (largely Afrikaaner) inherited from the 
Apartheid era; orient more than 300 MPs who had not previously served in any 
legislature16; coordinate with ANC Working Group, and coordinate committee 
chairs and  with leaders of the opposition; and most importantly, pass an 
unusually large volume of legislation required to restructure the legal 
framework bequeathed by Apartheid.17  At the same time, the Assembly had to 
change into a more representative and popular body reflecting the sea-change in 
the political system.   This meant that during the second parliament (1999 to 
2004), and especially in respect to oversight matters, committees were often 
kept on a tight leash which was resented by some committee chairs.  While 
regarded as “nurturing” by some ANC MPs in terms of helping them learn the 
skills of being a legislator, she was also regarded as an over-demanding task 
master who could have presided with a lighter hand and less controlling 
manner. 
(6)  The political culture of the ANC.   ANC MPs emphasise the unique political 
culture of their party and its impact on the way the party governs including its 
approach to parliamentary practice.   Several considerations are relevant here.  
The first, as its name implies, is that the ANC is a Congress and hence a “big 
and diverse tent.”   Though it draws the preponderance of its supporters from 
the African population, it has never waivered from its commitment to non-
racialism, and includes a significant non-African minority, i.e. whites, 
Coloureds and Asians, within its leadership ranks.   It is simultaneously the 
party of urban workers, intellectuals, non-white professionals, and the rural 
poor.   It is also a party that operates in close association with the South African 
                                                 
15 In the words of one long-time ANC MP, “While I have no doubt that the Speaker is 
committed to democracy, the problem is that she has difficulty getting round to being a 
democrat.” 
16 The National Assembly elected in 1994 included several dozen white and coloured MPs 
who had previously served in one of the three chambers of parliament that existed prior to the 
end of Apartheid, including members of the National Party and the Democratic Party, the 
predecessor to the DA. 
17 While the most onerous Apartheid laws such as the Race Classification Act, the Group 
Areas Act and the Suppression of Communism Act were all repealed in 1991, much of the 
technical legislation that buttressed the Apartheid state remained.  This was especially true in 
respect to legislation pertaining to labour and social welfare legislation, and to the structure 
and operations of local government.   The justice system also had to be completely 
overhauled. 
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Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trades Unions 
(COSATU).   Most fundamentally, and given its long-term objectives, many 
ANC leaders still regard the party as a “liberation movement” whose goal is to 
transform society rather than to govern society towards a more narrow set of 
policy goals. 
The tensions between key constituencies within the ANC are well-known, and a 
perennial question in South Africa is “How long will the movement remain 
intact?”  Precisely because it is “a big tent”, its members cannot be expected to 
forever march in lockstep with the leadership or with each other.  Thus, while 
the value of “democratic centralism” is still very much alive amongst ANC 
cadres, and while the practice of “redeployment” is accepted as a strategy for 
maintaining party discipline and utilising the individual talents of its diverse 
membership, there is also strong sentiment among many MPs that the leadership 
should loosen the reins.  Within the National Assembly, this sentiment is 
articulated most frequently by younger MPs, i.e. those in their thirties, by those 
who are better educated, and by a few “old timers” who express the view that 
centralised control has been taken too far, because it is no longer necessary for 
the ANC to pursue its agenda.  This in turn produces both a loyalty to the 
leadership and an internal dynamic of debate that shapes the party’s approach in 
the National Assembly.     
More Than a Rubber Stamp? 
The picture presented above appears to confirm unambiguously the 
conventional wisdom that the National Assembly is a rubber stamp of the ruling 
party, and therefore not an autonomous body.  The reality, is both more 
complex, and more hopeful if indeed an autonomous legislature is a hallmark of 
liberal democracy.   The case for autonomy can be summarised in terms of five 
arguments.   
(1) The National Assembly is an active body that amends most legislation.   
Between 75 and 80 percent of legislation introduced by executive is amended, 
often significantly, before the legislation becomes law.18  This is particularly 
true of “major” legislation, i.e. legislation that involves major changes in 
government policy and/or includes controversial proposals.  Although the 
executive introduces all but a handful of bills, and private members’ bills rarely 
                                                 
18 This estimate was provided by the senior unit staff member for managing legislation and 
procedures at the National Assembly. 
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become law, the final text of most legislation is crafted by the legislature.19  
Bills are first introduced in the National Assembly by the cabinet minister 
responsible for the policy in question.   This is the “first reading” of the bill 
after which it is referred to the appropriate portfolio committee for review and 
amendment.  Bills reported out of committee for the “second reading” before 
the Assembly as a whole are considered ready for passage, and if passed are 
forwarded to the upper house, the National Council of Provinces (NCOP), for 
its assent.   Some bills are referred back to committee for further amendment 
before a formal vote, including amendments desired by the minister.  In contrast 
to other Commonwealth legislatures there are only two official readings, or 
considerations of each bill.20  The process, however, is anything but swift as 
legislation often takes up to two years to be refined before final passage. 
During the “first parliament” following the assumption to power by the ANC in 
1994, the National Assembly passed 494 bills—an unusually high volume 
driven by the party’s desire to reverse or amend most legislation (and thus the 
legal framework of South Africa)  passed during the Apartheid era.   The 
volume dropped significantly during the “second parliament” which sat between 
1999 and 2004 when the Assembly passed roughly 313 pieces of legislation.   
The volume is expected to drop still further during the current parliament 
elected in 2004.  Nevertheless, the sheer volume of legislation considered by the 
Assembly coupled with the high percentage amended suggests that the National 
Assembly is a very active body compared to most other legislatures in Africa, 
and, for that matter, when compared to the legislatures of many established 
democracies.  Short of coding each piece of legislation introduced to the 
Assembly to specify the extent and nature of the amendments to each bill (an 
effort beyond the scope of this study), it is impossible to quantify with greater 
precision, the actual “autonomy” and “power” of the National Assembly.   
Many amendments were no doubt “minor” especially with respect to the overall 
policy of the legislation considered.  The Assembly did not reverse or 
significantly alter the thrust of the legislation intended by the ANC leadership.   
The impact of the Assembly, however, was still impressive.  
                                                 
19 Roughly a half-dozen private members’ bills are introduced each year.   Half are 
introduced by the opposition parties, particularly the DA while the remainder are introduced 
by ANC MPs.  Of the latter, most are introduced on behalf of the ANC caucus for a particular 
parliamentary committee as a mechanism for expediting the introduction of legislation that 
would otherwise be introduced by the relevant minister.   Such bills are introduced with the 
knowledge and support of the ANC’s Working Committee and parliamentary caucus.   
20 Legislation forwarded to the National Council of Provinces must be passed in identical 
form or reconciled with the version passed by the National Assembly if amendments are 
made—in which case there is the equivalent of a “third reading” when both houses meet 
together to pass the final bill. 
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(2) A system of portfolio committees of varying capacity.  Modern and 
autonomous legislatures that impact on the policy-making process are 
invariably legislatures with a well developed system of portfolio or ministerial 
committees—committees that shadow the ministries, departments and agencies 
(MDAs) that comprise the executive branch of government.   A feature of weak 
legislatures is that the committee system is either non-existent or lacks any 
genuine capacity to participate in the crafting of legislation or oversight of the 
executive.   By contrast, a hallmark of autonomous legislatures is that their 
system of portfolio committees has developed an institutionalised capacity for 
performing these functions.   Emerging legislatures in fledgling democracies 
fall somewhere in between—their committee systems are not fully established, 
but they have developed some observable capacity to contribute to the 
legislative process.  Although the committee system may still be at an early 
stage of development, the trendlines are clear.  South Africa falls within this 
middle category in a pattern that is very similar to emerging legislatures 
elsewhere on the continent. 
The South African National Assembly has 25 portfolio committees plus several 
standing committees including the Rules Committee, the Committee on 
Committees and the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA).  Most 
committees have roughly 20 to 25 members of which 15 to 18 are ANC MPs.   
Given its large majority, ANC MPs serve on only one committee while MPs of 
the Democratic Alliance usually serve on two in order to make their presence 
felt on all committees.  MPs from smaller parties, however, must pick and 
choose, and not all parties are represented on all. 
What does this “capacity” at the committee level consist of?   At its most basic 
level, capacity consists of a “critical mass” of a committee’s membership that is 
capable of participating fully in the committee’s work.   This means they 
understand the issues addressed in the legislation under consideration, they have 
developed at least a layman’s expertise on these issues, and they are sufficiently 
motivated that they devote the expected amount of time to committee work (e.g. 
they attend all or nearly all committee meetings, they prepare for such meetings 
by reading all documents to be considered, they make an effort to learn about 
the general policy area and major issues that fall within the committee’s 
responsibility, etc.).   Interviews with more than two dozen MPs, including 
members of the opposition, the chairs of six committees, and the outgoing 
Speaker, suggest that a “critical mass” for a typical committee is from between 
one third and one half of its members.   Yet when asked how many committees 
have such a membership, the answer was consistently “only between one 
quarter and one third”, i.e. between six to eight of the portfolio committees.   
Indeed, there was little variance in the assessment of the committee system.   
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Up to one third of the committees were deemed as doing “an effective” or “very 
good” job, one third were rated as average, and a third were rated as “not 
effective” or “below average.”  There was also a general agreement that a major 
challenge for the National Assembly was to increase the proportion of 
committees that could be rated as “effective” by upgrading and training their 
members.   This may be easier said than done, because a large number of ANC 
MPs, perhaps as many as 200 or 220 are individuals of limited educational 
background and/or professional experience.     These are individuals who gained 
their seats in parliament on the basis of their historical commitment to the ANC, 
especially during the armed struggle prior to 1994.  Indeed, the proportion of 
ANC MPs with professional experience was arguably less in the second 
parliament than in the first as a result of a high turnover of MPs following the 
1999 elections.21    
Committees that are regarded of having developed “capacity” also share the 
following characteristics.  First, the committee is invariably chaired by a highly 
motivated and knowledgeable MP who is intent that his or her committee 
performs its expected role.   In most, albeit not all cases, such chairs have a 
professional knowledge of  the subject matter of the committee, or they have 
committed themselves to learning the policy area of their committees in detail.   
Second, the chair is surrounded by between a half dozen to a dozen committee 
members who share his or her interest in the committee’s work.   Such members 
are more than likely to also have a professional or personal interest in the policy 
area of the committee.   Whether or not a critical mass exists in a particular 
committee is also a function of the chair’s ability to motivate his colleagues, and 
some are clearly more skilled at rallying the troops than others.      
Third, the committee has succeeded in recruiting a small staff,  often no more 
than one or two individuals, who are knowledgeable about the subject matter 
before the committee and/or who can facilitate the administration of the 
committee.   This includes, among other skills, the ability to reach out and 
consult with (and manage) key interest groups that weigh in on most legislation.  
Fourth, the committee has an adequate budget that enables it to recruit 
specialised staff and to pursue such investigations as it deems appropriate and 
necessary for fulfilling its role, e.g. it has a travel budget.  Fifth, committees 
have assigned space where they can regularly meet as well as office space for its 
staff.  Sixth, and perhaps most important, the committees is respected by other 
                                                 
21 A significant number of MPs with high or relatively high education and experience left 
parliament.  A large proportion of those that left were in fact promoted to senior 
governmental positions.  Others left because they decided to seek more remunerative or 
interesting employment in the private sector.   A few others were also dropped from the ANC 
list.   Whatever the reason, the quality of the present ANC membership is regarded by many 
observers as less than it was during the first parliament. 
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legislators, by the presiding officers of the National Assembly, by the ANC’s 
leadership, and by organisations outside legislature that are concerned with the 
same area of public policy.   This results in the committee being lobbied 
periodically by these outside organisations, because they have concluded that 
the “committee matters.”  Committees that exhibit these features in the National 
Assembly are also committees that from time to time may develop tensions with 
the ANC leaderhip including the cabinet minister whose ministry the committee 
shadows.  When the minister and the portfolio committee disagree, especially 
when the committee chair does not support the minister’s perspective, there are 
tensions. 
Another factor that determines the quality and capacity of committees is the 
volume of important legislation directed to the committee.   Committees such as 
Justice, Finance, Trade and Industry, Local Government, Transport and Social 
Development (and sometimes Health) are consistently rated as among the best 
in part because they dealt effectively with a large flow of legislation dropped in 
their laps by the executive.   This volume meant that the ANC assigned some of 
its most talented MPs to chair these committees, a critical factor in the 
development of the committees themselves.   Put differently, some committees 
have failed to develop significant capacity, because they have not had to—they 
could “coast” while others could not. 
Finally, it is important to note that because the most talented committee chairs 
are individuals with higher than average education and professional 
background, that a disproportionate number of committees deemed “effective” 
are those chaired by white members of the ANC, or members of other racial 
minorities.   Six of the seven  committees mentioned in the previous paragraph 
fall within this category.  Not surprisingly, this situation generates its own 
tensions within the the ranks of the ruling party though these tensions are rarely 
acknowledged in public.22 
(3) The legislature functions within a pluralistic society that has given rise to a 
well- organised civil society.   If there is one aspect of South Africa’s 
“exceptionalism” that is significant for the autonomy of its legislature, it is the 
fact that the country is a highly urbanised and informed society with a much 
larger civil society than most African countries.   Civil society across Africa is 
overwhelmingly an urban phenomena organised mainly by professionals though 
in some countries (as in  South Africa) labor unions are an important 
component.  Indeed, a major constraint on the democratisation of many African 
                                                 
22 However, privately, several of the MPs interviewed by this author candidly noted that this 
is a problem, though they were also quick to acknowledge that those who held the chairships 
of key committees certainly deserved their posts. 
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countries is that their civil society is weak to non-existent outside the major 
cities.   South Africa does not suffer from the problem.  In fact, one aspect of 
South Africa’s civil society that is matched by only a few other African 
countries is that there are many civil society organisations that seek to lobby 
government about relatively narrow economic issues with which they are 
concerned.   For example, in 2004, the national association of pharmacy 
proprietors, were very vocal in their opposition to a government bill that sought 
to regulate the prices pharmacies could charge for prescription drugs.    
There are several hundred such organisations which weigh in on legislation 
addressed to their primary interests by contacting the appropriate portfolio 
committee.  Portfolio committees have become a sounding board for civil 
society with the result that the most proactive committees are those that seek to 
preempt criticism by inviting representatives of these organisations to testify 
before these committees.   Such consultation in turn limits the degrees of 
freedom open to the executive on any one piece of proposed legislation.  Put 
differently, the chairs and active members of the most effective  committees 
know that part of their duty is to canvass relevant civil society organisations 
before writing the final version of a bill.   Such consultation might be viewed by 
some as a powerful constraint on the National Assembly, but the real constraint 
created by these organisations is on the executive because it is via the 
deliberations of the legislature that bills that displease civil society are modified 
and adjusted to balance the desires of the government with the concerns of those 
most affected by the proposed legislation.   One should hasten to add that the 
relations between civil society and government is not necessarily adversarial.   
This is because the most effective ANC chairs reach out to organisations with 
large African memberships and/or a presence in the townships or rural areas in 
order to balance lobbying by wealthier groups that are often fronts for 
established and white business interests.    Civil society thus strengthens the role 
of parliament vis-à-vis the executive, and because South Africa is a large and 
pluralistic society, the contribution of civil society to the development of the 
legislature is greater than in most states to the north. 
(4) There is a free press that covers parliament closely and informs the 
citizentry.  Although some observers argue that the South African press is less 
provocative today than during the final years of the Apartheid era, and that the 
press has been “dumbed down” like the media worldwide, the South African 
press is pretty much free to print what it wants—and does.  Though it is 
attracted to the sensational, e.g. the Arms Deal scandal of 1999-2000, it covers 
the major stories emanating from the National Assembly, e.g. the changes of 
key personal such as the presiding officers and chairs of the most important 
committees, the progress of controversial legislation, the investigations by the 
Standing Committee on Public Accounts.      
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The press corps assigned to cover parliament numbers approximately 45.  
Senior members contend that although meetings of the portfolio committees are 
open to the public, that the Assembly has become a more “opaque” institution 
since 1999.   They state that during the first parliament (1994-1999), relations 
between the press and key committee chairs were more informal than it is today.  
The press also had greater access.   Two reasons are given.  The first is that 
under Thabo Mbeki, the ANC is less forthcoming to the press than under 
Mandela—there is a studied coolness towards the press, and  younger African 
journalists are subject to quiet pressures to not be too aggressive in their 
questions and investigations.23   The second is the departure from parliament of 
committee chairs and other “stars” who got on well with the press.  Still, the 
press is a force to be reckoned with.  And given that its coverage of parliament 
informs civil society, it contributes to the mobilisation of those organisations 
that seek to hold the National Assembly to account.  Conversely, when the press 
is highly critical of the performance of the National Assembly, as it was over 
the ANC’s handling of the controversial arms deal in 1999 (and especially the 
party’s reining in of SCOPA), the press probably undermines public confidence 
in the institution.   The long-term impact of the press on the evolution of the 
National Assembly is hard to estimate though the relationship is certainly more 
open today than it was before 1994. 
(5)  A high level of financial and other resources.  A major finding from earlier 
work on both African legislatures (Barkan et. al. 2004) and the development of 
legislatures in other countries, including the United States (Squire 1992 and 
2005), is that resources count.   Legislatures that cannot acquire or otherwise 
generate adequate resources to support their members and their operations are 
unlikely to become autonomous and powerful bodies.   The level of salaries is 
especially important, particularly where MPs, are elected from single member 
districts and thus confronted by a series of incentives to devote more time to 
constituency service than to the collective functions of the legislature.   While 
that pressure does not exist in South Africa to the extent elsewhere in Africa, 
salaries and other personal emoluments as well as staff and physical 
infrastructure together form a critical package of resources without which the  
legislature is likely to develop.   That said, resources alone, do not make a 
legislature. 
Both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces are well 
endowed compared to most African legislatures.   Only in Kenya does an 
African legislature provide resources for its members on a level that that 
approaches that of South Africa.   MPs are well endowed in three important 
                                                 
23 Mbeki himself appears before the National Assembly for questions only quarterly whereas 
Mandela is reported to have done so monthly. 
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respects.    First, MPs receive a basic salary of R30,000 or per month.   This 
translates to a monthly take-home pay after taxes and other deductions of 
$3,000.   In addition, MPs receive health and pension benefits, a daily per diem 
while parliament is sitting in Cape Town, and travel allowances, including 
airfares, back to their places of residence when parliament is in recess.    
Second, all MPs are provided with a personal assistant, as well as a private 
office with internet access.   Indeed, the physical complex of buildings for both 
houses of parliament is impressive by any standard.  In addition to the chambers 
for each house and individual offices, there are meeting rooms for parliamentary 
committees, larger offices for the presiding officers, office space for staff, plus 
an attractive visitors centre.   The entire complex is IT friendly and dotted with 
flat screen TVs announcing scheduled committee meetings and other events or 
broadcasting the proceedings of the house.   Banners outside the main 
parliamentary buildings trumpet the role of parliament in South Africa’s 
democracy.   The surrounding grounds are impeccably kept—a quiet city park 
adjacent to the centre of Cape Town’s business district.   Apart from supporting 
MPs, the maintenance of these facilities projects an image of parliament to the 
public that is arguably “more important” than what it is in terms of its actual 
political impact.  Put differently, “the rhetorical image” exceeds its “political 
clout” while at the same time nurturing clout. 
Third, beginning in the second parliament, MPs have been provided R5,000 
($780) a month to support constituency service work.   Although MPs are 
elected via PR with the result that there are no formal parliamentary 
constituencies in South Africa, the ANC initiated a practice of defining 
geographic constituencies for each of its members and assigning MPs to these 
areas.   ANC MPs are expected to visit their “constituencies” whenever 
parliament is in recess, hold public meetings,  meet with individual constituents 
to help them with their problems (e.g. obtaining pension payments), and to hire 
and keep in frequent contact with a personal representative in the constituency 
when they are not there.   ANC MPs are also graded on constituency work, a 
rating that is supposed to be considered when determining their position on the 
party’s list when seeking reelection.   Constituency allowances are paid to each 
party based on their number of MPs and not directly to the MPs themselves.   
Smaller parties not only receive far less, but have far fewer MPs to cover all of 
South Africa.   As a result, only the DA and IFP maintain serious constituency 
efforts.    
The overall impact of constituency work is difficult to assess and beyond the 
scope of this study.   Interviews with ANC members, however, suggest that the 
party views this as an important aspect of each MPs job, and that such work 
enables the party to better understand the particular needs of different types of 
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communities and economic interests.   For example, one informant cited how 
his regular visits to a canning factory in his “constituency” taught him how 
pending legislation on labour relations would play out in that facility, the largest 
employer in that area.   Notwithstanding this support, Mattes reports that 
compared to African countries that elect their legislatures via single member 
district systems, the percentage of South Africans that have ever met their MP is 
among the lowest, approximately .2 percent (Mattes 2002).  
In addition to the support provided to individual MPs, Parliament has an 
extensive and qualified staff to facilitate the operations of both the National 
Assembly and the National Council of Provinces.   Several key members, 
including the Secretary to the National Assembly, and the unit manager of 
legislation and procedures are holdovers from the Apartheid era.  These 
officials, both of whom are Afrikaaners, reported that Parliament is a far livelier 
and important institution than it was prior to 1994 when the executive kept the 
legislature on a tight leash and the committee system was very weak.   By 
contrast there are now approximately 90 staff assigned to facilitate the work of 
the committees alone.  A major constraint, however, is the absence of 
specialised staff who can provide either individual MPs or the portfolio 
committees with adequate research support.   Committee chairs were 
particularly vocal on the need for better research support even though 
Parliament staffs a unit for this purpose.   One explanation for this seeming 
contradiction is political—committee chairs and the leaders of the opposition 
parties desire control over research done on their behalf.   They want staff 
dedicated to their needs and their committees rather than sharing a pool of 
researchers with other committees and the MPs of other parties.   The ANC 
tends to rely more on its party headquarters in Johannesburg for policy research, 
while the DA hires its own research assistants.  Neither regards present practice 
as satisfactory. MPs of both parties suggest that research staff should be 
assigned to committees as a way of providing more specialised expertise. 
Conclusions 
This review of the South African National Assembly ten years after the end of 
Apartheid presents a mixed yet fascinating picture of the evolution of this 
legislative body.  This in turn provides additional comparative experience from 
which to understand the development of emerging legislatures in emerging 
“Third-Wave” democracies generally, and particularly in Africa.   We can 
summarise these as follows. 
First, in respect of our initial question of whether the National Assembly is a 
rubber stamp or an autonomous and significant body, the answer is ambiguous.  
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It is like the proverbial glass of water that is either “half-full” or “half-empty” 
depending on one’s perspective.  Because it is nearly impossible to quantify or 
otherwise measure the degree of legislative autonomy or power, we are left to 
rely on “thick description” that suggests the National Assembly falls somewhere 
in between.  One might also ask whether the South African National Assembly 
would have produced different outcomes in its first ten years as a popularly 
elected body had procedures that would have granted the legislature greater 
autonomy been in place?   To this, the answer is most likely “no.” 
For example, had Thabo Mbeki with his inclination towards centralisation and 
control not become president of the ANC and of South Africa, would the 
legislative output of the National Assembly been significantly different?   The 
answer is clearly “no.”  While there may have been greater initiative taken by 
the Assembly itself, the nature of the legislation passed and the overall thrust of 
that legislation—to overturn the legal framework inherited from the Apartheid 
era—would have been the same.   Moreover, the volume of legislation passed 
was greatest during the first parliament (1994-1999) when Mbeki was not 
president. 
Would the committee system have functioned differently?   Here too, the 
answer is probably “no.”  Committee chairs may have had more autonomy and 
been elected by committee members, and there would have been fewer 
constraints imposed by the Speaker, but the overall functioning of the 
committee system in terms of legislative would have been arguably the same 
with respect to its content.  Moreover, had the Speaker not been in charge, it is 
quite possible that the Assembly would have performed less well than it actually 
did.   And despite her controlling tendencies, and those of the Working 
Committee, the fact remains that debate within the portfolio committees and 
within the ANC study groups is often intense as a true bargaining amongst MPs 
and between committee members and the responsible minister responsible 
occurs in these groups.  
If the National Assembly has a major weakness, it is in its capacity and 
modalities for performing its oversight role.  It is still feeling its way, especially 
in the wake of the reigning in of SCOPA’s investigation of the Arms Deal in 
1999-2000.24  Many ANC MPs felt burned and/or intimidated by that exercise 
                                                 
24 The Arms Deal was the biggest scandal involving allegations of corruption since the ANC 
took power in 1994.  The allegations focused on the Minister of Defense who supposedly 
received kickbacks for contracts to a German supplier of corvettes to the South African Navy 
and aircraft by a British aerospace firm.   At the recommendation of the Auditor General, 
SCOPA aggressively pursued the matter only to be shut down by the ANC Working Group 
with the assistance of the Speaker and the ANC Chief Whip.   The leading ANC member of 
the Committee was forced to drop off the committee and eventually left the National 
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while opposition MPs regard it as an unambiguous failure of the National 
Assembly to fulfill its constitutional role.  The former Speaker also 
acknowledged that the handling of this particular inquiry had complicated if not 
compromised the Assembly’s capacity in this area.    Several key ANC chairs 
also expressed the view that now that most of the ANC’s legislative programme 
has been translated into law, there is a need for the National Assembly to 
expand its oversight role.    One might add that given the dominance of the 
ANC, and the fact that it is now into its second decade in power (with the likely 
tendencies towards corruption that occurs when one party is in power for a long 
time), the need for are more systematic and expanded effort at oversight is 
manifest.  It is also clear that neither SCOPA or the individual portfolio 
committees will become more proactive in this task unless given the green light 
by the Working Committee.   The same can be said in the role of the National 
Assembly in approving major appoints made by the executive such as the 
appointment of ministers, judges, heads of state-owned corporations, 
commissions of inquiry etc.   So long as the President has the unfettered 
authority to make such appointments on his own, the power of the legislature is 
diminished. 
Fulfilling its oversight role also involves the capacity and opportunity of the 
National Assembly to question executive policies.  The Government of South 
Africa’s policy on HIV/AIDS is perhaps the biggest and most controversial 
issue in this regard.  Many ANC MPs are extremely disappointed with the 
government’s approach, and indeed have said so within the study group for the 
portfolio committee on health.  Here again, if the ruling party is determined to 
clamp down on or contain “dissent”, it is in a position to do so. 
By all accounts the National Assembly is also a marginal player with respect to 
the budgetary process.   While the Finance Committee is highly respected, it 
does not impact on the budget because the executive is firm in its pursuit of 
prudent macro-economic policy, and thus insists on maintaining the 
Commonwealth tradition that the executive alone sets the budget.   While one 
sign of an independent legislature is its ability to both set its own budget and 
reallocate the budget prepared by the Ministry of Finance, such independence is 
unlikely to occur in South Africa anytime soon.  This is in marked contrast to 
Kenya and Uganda where the legislature has established a parliamentary budget 
office for this purpose, and in Ghana and Tanzania where the idea of 
establishing such an office is gaining support among members of the 
backbench.    
                                                                                                                                                        
Assembly.   The case is regarded as a major failure on the part of the ANC to respect the 
work of the Assembly. 
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A final observation about the autonomy of the National Assembly regards the 
composition of the Assembly itself, especially the ANC’s delegation.   When 
discussing the work of the Assembly with the chairs of the most successful 
committees, all of whom are ANC, it is clear that one of the greatest constraints 
in raising the capacity and effectiveness of the Assembly is the quality of the 
ruling party’s MPs.  After all, more than two-thirds of the membership are 
ANC.  Not surprisingly, interviews with leading opposition MPs confirmed this 
assessment.  The diversity of the ANC parliamentary caucus has already been 
discussed, and in this regard the basic dilemma is as follows.  While the ANC is 
a non-racial party it is also the party of the majority and thus of the African 
population of South Africa.   It’s most educated and experienced MPs, however, 
are either white or members of Africa’s other minorities.   The leadership of the 
party in the Assembly, the group that carries the load are disproportionately 
non-African.   This situation exists not only because African ANC MPs are 
generally of lower professional backgrounds, but also because the best African 
MPs have been creamed off and promoted to positions in the executive—to 
become ministers or deputy ministers.   Still others have left for the private 
sector to take advantage of the many opportunities that were previously non-
existent.   What remains for parliament is decidedly the “second team.”  “Black 
empowerment” at a societal level may have resulted in a measure of relative 
disempowerment within the National Assembly. 
A challenge to both the Assembly and to the ANC is to therefore recruit 
university educated and talented Africans to become MPs.  This would be a 
highly controversial and sensitive move for the ANC leadership, because it will 
require their assigning lower rankings to some sitting MPs when setting the 
party’s list prior to the next election, or dropping some entirely.   This will be 
very difficult given the historical loyalties and the contributions of some in this 
group who sacrificed greatly during the fight against the former Apartheid 
regime.   But there departure is inevitable—either by design or by attrition.  So 
long as the Assembly remains a one-party dominant legislature, the greatest 
prospect for raising the capacity of the Assembly lies with the evolution of the 
ANC cadre in the legislature.    It is something that the party leadership may or 
may not want to hasten.  Indeed, the present situation gives them greater 
control.   The level of turnover between the first and the second parliaments and 
between the second and the third have been high—between one third and one 
half of all members.   High turnover generally retards the development of 
legislatures, but in this context the reverse may be true. 
Looking forward to subsequent parliaments five to fifteen years in the future, 
we can also conclude that the capacity and autonomy of the National Assembly 
is likely to rise, albeit incrementally, over time for two reasons.   First, the pool 
of potential African MPs with high or relatively high educational 
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backgrounds—for the ANC and for the opposition—will surely rise.  Indeed, it 
is already happening.  Second, at some point a credible opposition party to the 
ANC will emerge that will reduce the dominance of the ANC or displace the 
party as the ruling party.  Once parity or near parity is achieved between the 
parties, it is very likely that the Assembly will become a more open, and less 
controlled branch of government—a pattern already apparent in other African 
countries (e.g. Ghana, Kenya). 
Similarities with the Rest of Africa and Beyond 
Returning briefly to the seven factors that have contributed to the development 
of the legislature elsewhere in Africa, we find that notwithstanding the very 
different societal and political context within which the National Assembly 
functions, none of the explanatory variables relevant for the development of 
other African legislatures are questioned here.   On the contrary, the findings 
drawn from the South African case are consistent with those drawn from our 
previous case studies.  Put differently, if one holds the unique features of the 
South African example constant, the factors present in the other countries are 
present here as well.   Conversely, to the extent that the South African case 
provides a very different value for a key independent variable than those found 
in other countries, the results are in the expected direction. 
We therefore find (1) that the absence of the pressures of patron-client politics 
present in most other African countries coupled with the PR electoral system, 
means that MPs are not diverted from performing the collective functions of the 
legislature by spending excessive amounts of time on constituency service.   (2) 
The provisions of the South African constitution and Procedures of the National 
Assembly are not unusually restrictive or permissive with respect to the scope 
of the legislature when compared to the legislature elsewhere.   (3 and 4) The 
high level of resources available to the National Assembly, in the form of the 
level of MP salaries, and the level of collective resources (staff and 
infrastructure) contribute to the capacity of the institution.   Conversely, (5) the 
absence of parity between government and opposition in combination with (6) 
South Africa’s form of electoral system, contributes to the subordination of the 
National Assembly to the leadership of the ruling party.   
Where the National Assembly falls with respect to (7), the presence or absence 
of a coalition of reformers and/or opportunists seeking to expand the power of 
the legislature is less clear.  A core group of “reformers” certainly exists, but 
consists of two distinctly different groups of MPs.  One group, consisting 
almost totally of ANC proactive MPs certainly consider their mission as one of 
reform, but the meaning of reform is largely limited to translating the “ANC’s 
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project” into law and reality.  This group is itself divided between the chairs of 
the most active committees and their active rank and file, and the presiding 
officers of the Assembly, i.e. the Speaker and Deputy Speaker, Chief ANC 
whip, etc.   The former is probably more inclined than the latter to expanding 
the power of the legislature, particularly with respect the Assembly’s capacity 
for effective oversight of the executive branch because effective oversight is a 
mechanism to insure the implementation of legislation passed.   This group is 
also more likely to decentralise power within the Assembly to the portfolio 
committees.  Conversely, the inclinations of the presiding officers are to focus 
more on the passage of laws than on oversight, and less likely to challenge the 
executive. 
A second and smaller group of “reformers” are those activists within the 
opposition who believe that accountable government and the future of South 
African democracy require a more powerful legislature.   Their perspective of 
the executive is inherently adversarial, and they seek to check its power.   In 
sum, and as true elsewhere, e.g. Kenya and Ghana, the evolution of the 
legislature into an institution with the potential for exercising countervailing 
power will most likely occur when there is a coalition for such that bridges the 
divide between the ruling and opposition parties.   That coalition has yet to 
emerge in South Africa as a cohesive group.   The basic elements are there, but 
when such a group comes together, it will be a function of the realignment of 
South Africa’s political parties, the outcomes of future elections, and thus the 
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